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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men affiliated with the al Qaeda ter-
rorist organization hijacked four commercial airliners.' At approximately
8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11, holding eighty-one passengers,
* Dara Jebrock received her B.A. from the University of Florida and is a 2007 J.D.
Candidate at Nova Southeastern University. She would like to express her gratitude to Profes-
sor James Levy for his assistance and guidance in preparing this article. She would also like
to thank her family and friends for their encouragement and inspiration. Finally, she would
like to thank her colleagues at Nova Law Review, especially Jennifer Viciedo, for their relent-
less effort in preparing this article for publication.
1. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
THE 9/11 COMM'N REP. 1-2 (Comm'n Print 2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
91 l/pdf/execsummary.pdf [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
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crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.2 "[S]omething
terrible is happening, ' 3 Stuart Meltzer declared while on the phone with his
wife from the 105th floor of the building.4 This would be the last time the
two would speak.' All of the passengers onboard Flight 11, including an
unknown number of people in the building, were killed.6
Approximately eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, with
fifty-six passengers on board, slammed into the South Tower of the World
Trade Center.7 "'The place is filling with smoke,' a person [located] in [a]
New York office was heard to say [just before the phone] connection was cut
off."'8 Consequently, all of the passengers on board Flight 75, along with an
undetermined number of people in the building, were killed.9
It is "an 'apparent terrorist attack"' on our country,'0 President Bush
proclaimed just before American Airlines Flight 77, traveling at approxi-
mately 530 miles per hour, smashed into the Pentagon." All fifty-eight pas-
sengers on board Flight 77 were killed, in addition to 125 civilian and mili-
tary personnel located in the building.'2
At approximately 10:00 a.m., "Alice Hoglan's son, Mark, called her
from United Airlines Flight 93" and told her that the plane had been "taken
over." ' 3 Shortly thereafter, the fourth plane holding thirty-seven passengers
crashed into a rural field in southern Pennsylvania. 4 The hijacker's objec-
tive was to crash the fourth airliner into either the Capitol Building or the
White House, but a counterattack by the passengers of United Flight 93 de-
feated that goal. 5 Unfortunately, all of the people on board the airliner were
killed.'
6
2. Id; see also September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM, SEPT. 12, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack [hereinafter Chronology].
3. Scott Veale, Voices from Above: 'I Love You, Mommy, Goodbye,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2001, wk 7 (citation omitted).
4. Id. (citation omitted).
5. See id. (citation omitted).
6. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Id. at 1; Chronology, supra note 2.
8. Veale, supra note 3 (citation omitted).
9. Chronology, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1; NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST
ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMM'N REP. 10 (Comm'n Print 2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 l/pdf/sec1.pdf (citations omitted) [hereinafter COMM'N REP.].
12. Chronology, supra note 2; see also COMM'N REP., supra note 11, at 10.
13. Veale, supra note 3 (citation omitted).
14. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1; Chronology, supra note 2.
15. EXECUTVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1.
16. See id. at 1-2.
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The deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented
in America's national history.' 7 There is no doubt that sophisticated tech-
nologies, especially internet communication, were essential to allow the
planning and plotting of the attacks. 8 As a result, President Bush, along
with Congress, responded by enacting the Uniting and Strengthening Amer-
ica by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism Act of 2001,"9 generally known as the USA PATRIOT Act, in order
to allow law enforcement and intelligence agencies greater authority in track-
ing and intercepting communications."
More specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act made a series of controver-
sial amendments to the United States Code.21 In particular, this article fo-
cuses on 18 U.S.C. § 2709, which "authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) to compel .. .internet service providers (ISPs) or telephone
companies, to produce ... customer records whenever the FBI certifies that
those records are 'relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.' ' 22  The FBI
makes those demands by sending national security letters to the communica-
tion provider.23 Once the national security letter is formally issued, § 2709
bars the recipient from contesting the grounds for the letter and prohibits the
recipient from notifying the customers that their personal information has
been provided to the FBI.24 That means the provider is forced to turn over
the requested records or else face criminal prosecution.25 Thus, this provi-
sion raises serious constitutional questions because § 2709, as amended,
grants the FBI the extraordinary power to obtain records without obtaining a
warrant" supported by probable cause and judicial oversight as required by
the Fourth Amendment.27
17. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
18. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to Employees at the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010925-5.html; see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 636 (2003) (stating al
Qaeda was known to favor internet technologies).
19. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
20. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Signing of the PATRIOT
Act, Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oct. 26, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/10/20011026-5.html [hereinafter Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing].
21. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
22. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2003)).
23. Id. at 475.
24. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2000)).
25. See § 2709.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003); see United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424,
429 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (finding that the warrant procedure generally requires the government to
2006]
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According to President Bush, the USA PATRIOT Act provision grant-
ing the FBI such vast power was necessary in allowing the government to
enforce laws "with all the urgency of a nation at war."2 However, this arti-
cle will demonstrate that expanding the FBI's power to conduct terrorism
investigations abolishes important Fourth Amendment protections. Part II of
this article will provide a historical overview of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, while Part III will examine traditional Fourth Amendment protections
in light of national security operations. Part IV will discuss the erosion of
Fourth Amendment freedoms after 9/11 as a result of the technologies that
allowed terrorists to evade law enforcement more easily. Part V will analyze
the decision rendered in Doe v. Ashcroft, because the opinion describes how
Fourth Amendment protections cannot be guaranteed within the sole discre-
tion of the FBI and, in turn, without judicial approval. 29 Part VI will provide
recommendations to revise § 2709 in order to reduce Fourth Amendment
implications. Lastly, part VII will conclude with a summary of this article.
II. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals with some of the most basic
protections against government intrusion.30 In short, the Framers of the Con-
stitution designed the Fourth Amendment as a way to break away from Brit-
ish policy, which allowed for the issuance of general warrants. 31 Those types
of warrants generally allowed officials to break into an individual's home,
store, or other personal place and seize goods based on minimal suspicion of
criminal activity.32 Since there were no requirements of probable cause and
judicial oversight, the use of the general warrant was widely abused and
caused significant intrusions into individuals' personal lives because once the
warrant was obtained, there was no limit to what the official could search or
obtain a warrant based on probable cause, supported by judicial authorization, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized).
27. The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing, supra note 20.
29. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471,506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MIcH. L.
REv. 547, 657-58 (1999).
32. See id. at 693-94.
[Vol. 30:2:279
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seize.33 Moreover, because there was no fact finder to determine whether the
suspicion was justified, the official could easily lie to obtain a warrant.34
However, the Framers' concern when drafting the Fourth Amendment
was not the issuance of the warrant itself.35 The Framers' concern was the
lack of procedural limitations placed on law enforcement's ability to invade
an individual's privacy. 36 As a result, the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement, as examined below, was specifically written to protect individuals
against unjustified police behavior.37
A. The Warrant Requirement
Requiring a warrant to conduct a search or seizure was the Framers'
way of protecting individuals from unwarranted government intrusions by
limiting its ability to conduct investigations.38 One of the first cases decided
concerning the scope of the warrant requirement was Ex parte Jackson.39 In
Jackson, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that searches and
seizures of personal documents in a criminal investigation require a war-
rant.4° The Court held that:
[t]he constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may
be. [Letters and sealed packages] can only be opened and exam-
ined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when
papers are subjected to search in one's own household. 1
Thus, under Jackson, a warrantless search and seizure of an individual's pri-
vate property constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.42
Over time, the Court broadened the scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to include searches and seizures involving entry into a person's home, as
33. See id. at 703-06.
34. See id. at 576-79.
35. Id. at 571-82.
36. See Davies, supra note 32, at 571.
37. See id. at 700-01.
38. See id. at 703-06.
39. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
40. Id. at 733.
41. Id.
42. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV
20061
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well as the curtilage surrounding the property. 43 That augmentation was sig-
nificant because it furthered the premise that individuals should be protected
from unwarranted government intrusion not only in the privacy of their own
home, but also in a limited, judicially-defined area surrounding their home.44
Moreover, in Camara v. Municipal Court,45 the Court then extended those
principles to include routine administrative searches of a home.' In
Camara, the petitioner leased the ground floor of a building to use as his
personal residence.47 The case arose when the petitioner did not allow an
inspector of the Division of Housing to perform a routine administrative
search of his home.48 As a result, the petitioner was charged with "refusing
to permit a lawful inspection in violation" of a city ordinance.49 On appeal,
the petitioner alleged that a search of private property is unreasonable unless
it has been authorized by a search warrant.5" The Court agreed, holding that
administrative searches authorized and conducted without a warrant are sig-
nificant intrusions upon privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.5' Thus, the Court reversed the conviction, reinforced the importance
of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and expanded the scope of
this amendment's protections. 2
1. Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment generally requires a showing of probable cause
before law enforcement may obtain a warrant to conduct a search or seizure
43. E.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (recognizing that Fourth
Amendment protection extends not only to houses, but also to the area surrounding the resi-
dence, generally known as "curtilage"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
44. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
45. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
46. Id. at 534. In general, an administrative search is an inspection made by a govern-
ment official in regards to municipal fire, health, and housing evaluation programs. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (8th ed. 2004).
47. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 527. This case dealt with section 503 of the Housing Code which permits:
[a]uthorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary
for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform
any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.
Id. at 526.
50. See id. at 525.
51. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
52. See id. at 534, 546.
[Vol. 30:2:279
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of property.53 Under the probable cause rule, law enforcement cannot search
a person's home or seize private documents unless they have specific facts to
believe that the subject of the search or seizure is connected with criminal
activity.54 The purpose of that requirement is to lessen the possibility that
law enforcement will commit perjury to create a reason for discovering in-
criminating evidence.5 For that reason, warrants lacking probable cause
usually violate the Fourth Amendment.
5 6
2. Judicial Approval
In addition, the warrant requirement generally mandates that an inde-
pendent judicial officer determine whether probable cause exists to conduct a
search or seizure. 7 In Johnson v. United States, 8 the United States Supreme
Court stated that a warrant can only be issued by a "neutral and detached
magistrate."" Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson reasoned that:
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to
support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a war-
rant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the peo-
ple's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime,
even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
55. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
56. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (citations omitted).
58. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
59. Id. at 14.
2006]
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yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
60
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment was designed
to prevent the depreciation of personal freedom, personal security, and prop-
erty interests because those rights "'are to be regarded as of the very essence
of constitutional liberty."' 6' Accordingly, the Court recognized that allowing
law enforcement to seek personal information without judicial oversight vio-
lates the core principles of the Fourth Amendment.62
Subsequently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,63 the Court held that it is
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment for a government official to
issue a warrant, even if authorized to do so as a justice of the peace, when
that official is engaged in the criminal investigation.' 4 In Coolidge, police
went to the defendant's home to question him about a murder. 65 Thereafter,
the police presented the results of their inquiry to the State Attorney General
because he was leading the murder investigation.66 After concluding there
was sufficient evidence to charge the defendant, the Attorney General, acting
as a justice of the peace, 67 issued a warrant to search the defendant's prop-
erty.68 At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder based on evidence
obtained from the searches.69 The defendant appealed, alleging that such
evidence should not have been admitted at trial because it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.7" The Court agreed, holding that a war-
rant issued by a government official involved in law enforcement activities
does not constitute a "neutral and detached magistrate" in accordance with
the warrant procedure of the Fourth Amendment.7'
60. Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 17 n.8 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
62. See id. at 17.
63. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
64. Id. at 453.
65. Id. at 445.
66. Id. at 446-47.
67. "Under New Hampshire law in force at that time, all justices of the peace were au-
thorized to issue search warrants." Id. at 447.
68. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 447.
69. See id. at 448.
70. Id. at 449.
71. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:279
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B. From Property to Privacy
The invention of surveillance technologies provided law enforcement
with the ability to surreptitiously observe and record an individual's private
telephone conversations.72 The warrantless use of such technology to aid
securing criminal convictions was challenged for the first time in Olmstead
v. United States.73 In Olmstead, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to violate the National Prohibition Act.74 Federal officers obtained the evi-
dence that led to their conviction by inserting small wires along the ordinary
wires of a telephone company which was connected to the defendants' resi-
dences.75 Using the taps on the telephone wires, federal officials surrepti-
tiously listened to the defendants' conversations and took stenographic
notes. 76 As a result, federal officials procured evidence to indict and eventu-
ally convict the defendants of conspiracy.77 In 1928, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the use of evidence obtained from
wiretapping the defendants' private conversations constituted a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.7" On a five-to-four vote, the Court held that the use
of wiretapping to obtain evidence without a search warrant was not within
the confines of the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical en-
croachment onto the defendants' property.79
After Olmstead, the measure of Forth Amendment protection was de-
termined on a property-based analysis. However, in 1967, the Supreme
Court redefined the Amendment's scope by recognizing "that the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than [the
further protection of] property. 8 ° In Katz v. United States,81 the Supreme
Court held that the "Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures," and that its reach
"cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure."82 In Katz, the petitioner, a bookkeeper, was suspected of
using a public telephone booth to conduct business transactions in violation
72. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,455 (1928).
73. Id. at 438.
74. Id. at 455.
75. Id. at 456-57.
76. Id. at 457.
77. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 457.
78. Id. at 455.
79. Id. at 466.
80. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
81. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
82. Id. at 353.
20061
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of a federal statute.83 To confirm those suspicions, the FBI placed an elec-
tronic eavesdropping device on the outside of the telephone booth, which
recorded the petitioner's conversations. 84 As a result, the petitioner was
charged and convicted of transmitting gambling information by telephone
across state lines. On appeal, the petitioner alleged that the recordings had
been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.86 However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that no violation occurred be-
cause the FBI agents did not physically enter the telephone booth.87
In light of that ruling, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to consider whether electronic surveillance was subject to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.88 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Stewart declared that:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected.89
For those reasons, the Court ruled that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurs when FBI agents conduct electronic surveillance of an
individual without presenting "their estimate of probable cause for detached
scrutiny by a neutral magistrate," even when there is no interference with
property.9" Consequently, the petitioner's conviction was reversed because
he had not been provided with the procedural safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment.9' Thus, the Court's decision is significant because it recognizes
the importance of protecting Fourth Amendment liberties, especially when
technological innovations threaten personal privacy.9
83. Id. at 348. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 made it a crime to "knowingly [use] a wire communica-
tion facility for the transmission in interstate.., commerce of bets or wagers.., on any sport-
ing event or contest .... which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
bets or wagers." Id. at 348 n. I (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 348.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
86. Id. at 348-49.
87. Id. at 349.
88. Id. at 349-50.
89. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 356.
91. Id. at 359.
92. See id. at 349-53.
[Vol. 30:2:279
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY AS A POTENTIAL EXCEPTION
In Katz, the majority declined to consider whether national security in-
vestigations should be exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.93 However, Justice White noted in his concurring opinion that the
warrant requirement and the objective judgment of a magistrate would be
unnecessary "if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer,
the Attorney General," authorized electronic surveillance in national security
situations.94
Alternatively, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion proclaimed
that:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In
matters where they believe national security may be involved they
are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate
must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitu-
tion, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disin-
terested. Rather it should vigorously investigate and prevent
breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the
pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are
properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national
security cases.
95
In his conclusion, Justice Douglas acknowledged that throughout history the
Fourth Amendment has never been construed to distinguish between differ-
ent types of crimes.96 Thus, those opinions suggest that there are constitu-
tional limitations on the government's ability to obtain intelligence informa-
tion even in the name of national security.
A. National Security in Domestic Affairs
Following Katz, courts had difficulty determining whether there is in
fact a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.97 For example, in United States v. Smith, the defendant was found
guilty of violating a federal statute and sentenced to two years in prison.98
The defendant appealed his conviction and while "pending, the government
93. Id. at 358 n.23.
94. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 360.
97. See United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
98. Id. at 424.
2006]
11
Jebrock: Securing Liberty: Terrorizing Fourth Amendment Protections in a P
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAW REVIEW
disclosed to the Court of Appeals that it" monitored the defendant's conver-
sations by electronic surveillance to gather information regarding a national
security investigation.99 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the United States District Court of the Central District of California to
consider whether it was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for the
government to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance without judicial
approval, even though such surveillance had been authorized by the Attorney
General for national security purposes.' ° At the proceeding, the government
argued that although a warrant was not obtained prior to conducting the sur-
veillance, it was constitutional because it had been expressly authorized by
the Attorney General to gather information necessary to protect the nation.' 0
More specifically, that the surveillance was reasonable because "the Presi-
dent, acting through the Attorney General, has the inherent constitutional
power" to authorize electronic surveillance without a judicially approved
warrant in national security cases and to unilaterally determine whether a
situation constitutes a national security matter.10 2 However, the district court
disagreed, holding that in domestic situations there is no national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 103 Moreover, "the
President is... subject to the constitutional limitations imposed upon him by
the Fourth Amendment," 4 which means that he cannot judicially determine
the restrictions on his power to protect the security of the nation.0 5 The
court reasoned that the Constitution was drafted "to strike a balance between
the protection of political freedom and the protection of the national security
99. Id.
100. Id. at 424, 426.
101. Id. at 426. To support its argument, the government relied on the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which stated in relevant part:
[T]he constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall any-
thing ... limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or exis-
tence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by au-
thority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in
any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall
not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 425 (quoting Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 197, 214).
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id. at 429.
104. Id. at 425.
105. See Id. at 425-30.
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interest."' 6 Thus, "to sacrifice those freedoms in order to defend them' ' 7
would undermine the democratic system.0 8 Consequently, the electronic
surveillance violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because it
had been authorized without judicial oversight.' °9
Likewise, in United States v. Sinclair,110 the United States District Court
of the Eastern District of Michigan furthered the Smith rationale by holding
that the President, acting through the Attorney General, does not have the
inherent constitutional power to authorize, without a judicial warrant, elec-
tronic surveillance in national security investigations."' In Sinclair, the de-
fendant was indicted based on evidence which was obtained when the FBI
conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of the defendant's telephone
conversations."
2
The dispute arose when the defendant made a motion to suppress such
evidence, alleging that it was acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement because it lacked judicial approval."3 In response, the
government asserted that the electronic monitoring of the defendant's con-
versations was lawful because the Attorney General, acting as an agent of the
President, authorized the surveillance in the interest of national security."4
Particularly, the government argued that the evidence should not be sup-
pressed because the President has the inherent constitutional power to au-
thorize warrantless electronic surveillance when gaining such information is
essential to the security of the nation.'' 5
Nevertheless, the district court disagreed, stating that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment warrant procedure is to maintain a system of checks and
balances between the citizens and the government.1 6 Therefore, independent
judicial review of whether or not probable cause exists to issue a warrant is
essential because it protects citizens' "constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures."" 7 Further, the court explained that if
the executive branch were granted unchecked investigative power in domes-
tic situations, citizens' Fourth Amendment protections would be threat-
106. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 430.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
111. Id. at 1077.
112. Id. at 1075-76.
113. Id. at 1076.
114. Id.
115. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1077.
116. Id. at 1078.
117. Id.
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ened." s For those reasons, the court held that the evidence should be sup-
pressed because there is no exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement in domestic situations involving national security.' 1
9
Following Smith and Sinclair, the Supreme Court ruled that in domestic
situations the executive branch is not exempt from obtaining a judicially ap-
proved warrant when seeking information in a national security investiga-
tion. 12 In United States v. United States District Court (Keith),12' the gov-
ernment "charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy [g]overnment
property in violation of' a federal statute. 22 During pretrial proceedings, the
defendants filed a motion to determine whether certain surveillance informa-
tion obtained by the government complied with the defendants' Fourth
Amendment rights. 23 In response, the government alleged that such infor-
mation was obtained lawfully because the surveillance conducted without
judicial approval was authorized by the Attorney General "'to gather intelli-
gence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the
Government.""2 4 More specifically, the government argued that requiring
judicial oversight would create a danger of leaks, threaten the need for se-
crecy, and endanger the lives of informants and agents. 25 However, the Dis-
trict Court disagreed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. 1
26
In response to that decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine "'[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving ... national
security. ' ''" 27 To answer this question, the Supreme Court began by noting
that under Article H, Section 1 of the Constitution, the President has the duty
"to 'preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,"' 12
8
especially against those who try to depose the government. 2 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell expressed his apprehension towards allowing elec-
tronic surveillance in national security matters because it provides the gov-
118. See id. at 1079.
119. Id. at 1079-80.
120. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972).
121. Id. at 297.
122. Id. at 299.
123. See id. at 299-300.
124. Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
125. Keith, 407 U.S. at 319.
126. Id. at 301.
127. Id. at 309 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967)).
128. Id. at 310 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
129. Id.
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ernment with the capability to intrude upon individuals' Fourth Amendment
rights. 3 ' However, Justice Powell recognized that technological develop-
ments have resulted in new ways to depose the government."' For that rea-
son, Justice Powell stated that it would be contrary to public interest to deny
the government use of such technology, since it is necessary to counteract the
practice of techniques which threaten democracy. 132 As a result, the Court
acknowledged that the conflict between the government's need to act when
safeguarding the nation's security and individual rights will be implicated in
any situation concerning electronic surveillance of a person's private activi-
ties. 33 Consequently, the Court balanced those values, concluding that the
guarantee that an individual's privacy can only be invaded upon the issuance
of a warrant by a neutral and detached magistrate founded on probable cause
prevails over the government's duty to preserve national security. 134 More-
over, domestic security surveillances conducted entirely within the discretion
of the Executive Branch is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment because
those officials are not neutral and detached. 35 Finally, the role of judicial
approval cannot be dispensed because it "accords with [the] basic constitu-
tional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through [the]
separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches
and levels of [g]ovemment."' 136
B. National Security in Foreign Affairs
Based on the Court's decision in Keith, it is clear that there is no na-
tional security exception to the Fourth Amendment in situations involving
domestic investigations. 37 However, the Court expressly refused to define
the constitutional limitations on the Executive Branch's power to meet for-
eign threats to the nation. 3 As a result, the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections still remain uncertain in situations involving the Executive
Branch and foreign security surveillance.
In Noro v. United States, 139 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether the search and seizure of account books owned by Japanese
130. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 312.
131. Seeld. at312.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 312-13.
134. See id. at 312-17.
135. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17.
136. Id. at 317.
137. See id. at 321.
138. Id. at 321-22.
139. 148 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1945).
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citizens living in the United States was a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.140 In Noro, the defendants were Japanese citizens who established a
business in the United States, which had been licensed by the Secretary of
the Treasury.14' Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President ordered
customs officers to remove books, files, and accounts of all Japanese enter-
prises licensed in the United States. 42 As a result, customs officers seized
account books from the defendants' business without obtaining a judicially
approved warrant. 43 After searching the books, the government discovered
that the defendants completed false income tax returns.' 44 Based on that dis-
covery, the defendants were charged with tax evasion and were convicted at
trial. "' On appeal, the defendants argued that the entry into their place of
business and the seizure of their account books violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because such documents were obtained without a judicially authorized
warrant. 14 6 However, the court disagreed stating that no violation occurred
because "searches in the sudden emergency of war [are] necessary to be
made ... with all speed and efficiency, under the urgent orders of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of the Treasury."' 147 Thus, the court recognized that the
Executive Branch has the power to authorize searches and seizures without
judicial oversight in situations that involve foreign threats to the security of
the nation. 4
8
Likewise, in United States v. Brown,149 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the President
for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information without prior
judicial approval was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 50 In
Brown, the defendant was charged and convicted of transporting a firearm in
violation of a federal statute. '5' The defendant appealed his conviction and,
while the appeal was pending, federal officials monitored and recorded the
defendant's telephone conversations without judicial authorization.12  On
appeal, the defendant argued that the warrantless wiretaps violated his Fourth
140. Id. at 697.
141. Id. at 697-98.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 697.
144. Noro, 148 F.2d at 697.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 698.
148. Id. at 698-99.
149. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
150. Id. at 426 (citing United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1970)).
151. Id. at420.
152. Id. at 421.
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Amendment rights.'53 In response, the government contended that no viola-
tion occurred because the wiretaps had been authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral, acting as an agent of the President, for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence. 54  Consequently, the court agreed with the government, ex-
plaining that the President has the inherent authority to protect national secu-
rity in the context of foreign affairs.'55 Thus, the court recognized that it is
constitutionally permissible for the Executive Branch to conduct searches or
seizures without a judicially approved warrant when "safeguard[ing] the na-
tion from possible foreign encroachment."' 56
Similarly, in United States v. Butenko,'57 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the President's authority to authorize warrantless searches in
foreign intelligence investigations does not contravene the safeguards of the
Fourth Amendment. 58 At trial, one of the defendants, a Soviet national, was
convicted of conspiring to transmit foreign government information relating
to the national defense of the United States.'59 Federal officials obtained the
evidence that led to this conviction by conducting warrantless electronic
wiretaps of the defendant's conversations which were authorized by the At-
torney General for purposes of gathering foreign intelligence information."
The defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated because the material collected through the elec-
tronic surveillance was obtained without a judicially authorized warrant.' 6'
On appeal, the court disagreed, holding that the President can authorize war-
rantless searches without prior judicial approval when the primary purpose of
those searches is to secure foreign intelligence information. 62 However, the
court noted that under these circumstances the Fourth Amendment requires
post-search judicial review in order for electronic surveillance to be lawful
because post-judicial oversight ensures that the primary purpose of the gov-
ernment's investigation is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 63
153. Id. at425.
154. Brown, 484 F.2d at 425.
155. Id. at 426.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
158. Id. at 603-06.
159. Id. at 596.
160. Id. at 596-601.
161. Id. at 596.
162. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603-06.
163. Id. at 605-06.
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IV. EROSION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11
Following September 11, 2001, securing the nation demanded height-
ened vigilance because technological innovations allowed terrorists to evade
law enforcement more easily. On October 26, 2001, Congress enacted the
USA PATRIOT Act64 to provide government officials with greater authority
when conducting terrorism investigations. 65  In particular, the USA
PATRIOT Act revised 18 U.S.C. § 2709 in order to expand the FBI's power
to obtain customer information from internet service providers and telephone
companies. 1
66
Originally, § 2709 was enacted as a part of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986,67 which was designed to protect commu-
nications customers from unwarranted invasions into privacy, while at the
same time allowing law enforcement access to records after satisfying the
warrant requirement. 61 Under the ECPA, § 2709 operated as an exception to
the warrant requirement in order to permit the FBI to seek records upon issu-
ing a national security letter to an internet service provider or telephone
company by certifying that 1) the requested "information was 'relevant to an
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation[;]"' and 2) that there was
probable cause to believe that the customer to whom the information sought
was connected to a "'foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."" 6 9 Sub-
sequently, Congress further revised § 2709 to allow the FBI to obtain cus-
tomer records where there is a contact with a suspected terrorist or where
circumstances of the conversations indicate that the customer may have in-
formation regarding terrorist activities. 7 Recently, in 2001, § 505 of the
USA PATRIOT Act dispensed § 2709's foreign nexus requirement, "replac-
ing that prerequisite with a broad standard of relevance to investigations of
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."'' Under the current provi-
sion, "' law enforcement officials have unchecked power to obtain a person's
164. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
165. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 607.
166. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003)).
167. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848.
168. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 481 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000)).
170. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 483. Compare 18 U.S.C § 2709 (2000), with 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp.
2003).
172. The amended version of § 2709 states:
(a) DuyT TO PROVIDE. - A wire or electronic communication service provider shall comply
with a request for subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic
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private information from an internet service provider or telephone company
without a warrant, and, in turn, without judicial authorization. 173  As dis-
cussed below in the case of Doe v. Ashcroft, to allow the government to ob-
tain private information in the manner provided by § 2709 is arguably an
unjustified encroachment upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
V. DOE V. ASHCROFT
A. The Case for Controversy
The controversy began when John Doe'74 received a telephone call from
the FBI informing him that he would be served with a national security let-
ter."'75 Shortly thereafter, Doe received a document stating that pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 2709, he was required to provide certain intelligence information
to the FBI.176 Printed on FBI letterhead, the national security letter was certi-
fied in compliance with the terms of § 2709. 7' Specifically it stated, "'that
the information sought [was] relevant to an authorized investigation to pro-
communication transactional records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) REQUIRED CERTIFICATION. -The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his
designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a
Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may-
(1) request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll
billing records of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee) certifies in writ-
ing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is
made that the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are
relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and
(2) request the name, address, and length of service of a person or entity if the Di-
rector (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication
service provider to which the request is made that the information sought is relevant
to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandes-
tine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(C) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.-No wire or electronic communication service
provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this sec-
tion.
18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
173. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96.
174. "John Doe" is a fictitious name used to describe an internet service provider. Id. at
475.
175. Id. at 478.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.' 178
Moreover, Doe was warned not to disclose anything about the national secu-
rity letter, not even that he received it.'79 Accordingly, Doe contacted the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)"8 ° and the American Civil Liberties
Foundation (ACLF) seeking legal advice about whether the FBI had the au-
thority to demand records from him.'8
In April 2004, the ACLU and the ACLF, acting as counsel for John
Doe, filed a lawsuit challenging the FBI's authority to issue national security
letters instructing communication firms to disclose customer records.182 In
the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that § 2709 violates the Fourth Amend-
ment because it allows the FBI to obtain private information without any
form of judicial oversight. 183 In response, the government argued that the
congressional purpose of the provision was to allow the FBI greater investi-
gative powers because there is a need for secrecy in national security investi-gations."8
B. Securing Fourth Amendment Freedoms
Unwilling to sacrifice liberty for security, Judge Marrero of the United
States District Court of the Southern District of New York ruled that the pro-
vision authorizing the FBI to demand customer records from internet service
providers and telephone companies "whenever the FBI certifies that those
records are 'relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against interna-
tional terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,""' 185 violates the Fourth
Amendment. 86 Judge Marrero began his analysis by recognizing that "[n]a-
tional security is a paramount value, unquestionably one of the highest pur-
poses for which any sovereign government is ordained. Equally scaled... is
personal security .... [a] guarantee ... to be free from imposition by [the]
government."' 87 Moreover, Judge Marrero acknowledged that in order "[t]o
178. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 479.
180. The ACLU is an organization that advocates for individual rights and liberties. See
American Civil Liberties Union, About Us, http://www.aclu.org/about/index.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Challenge to NSL Authority].
181. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475,479.
182. Id.; American Civil Liberties Union, Challenge to National Security Letter Authority,
(Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/17458res20040929.html.
183. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96.
184. Id. at 500.
185. Id. at 475 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2003)).
186. Id. at 506.
187. Id. at 476.
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perform its national security functions properly, government must be em-
powered to respond promptly and effectively to public exigencies as they
arise," while at the same time "maintain a reasonable measure of secrecy"
when conducting its investigations.188 Consequently, such a race will inevi-
tably cause a collision between securing the nation and protecting Fourth
Amendment freedoms.' 89
Expounding on those principles, Judge Marrero recognized that the
temptation to dispense with such freedoms was arguably grounded given the
emotional aftermath of 9/11 190 However, in addressing the Government's
reach to combat terrorism, Judge Marrero declared that the "'state of war is
not a blank check"' to dispense those rights so clearly grounded in the core
of the Constitution. 9' Therefore, because "longstanding Supreme Court doc-
trine makes clear"'192 that Fourth Amendment guarantees are fundamental to
the democratic system, § 2709 "must be invalidated because ... it has the
effect of authorizing coercive searches effectively immune from any judicial
process."' 19 3 Thus, the decision rendered in Ashcroft suggests that expanding
the FBI's investigative power to seek personal information without judicial
oversight, even during times when national security is at its apex, is likely
unconstitutional since such authority allows for abuse of Fourth Amendment
rights.'94
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Applying the abovementioned Supreme Court jurisprudence to § 2709,
as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, clearly infringes on our Fourth
Amendment rights.' 9 However, the technological innovations used by the
terrorists to plan and plot the events of 9/11 clearly were not within contem-
plation of the Supreme Court at the time it rendered those pre-9/11 deci-
sions.'96 Yet what is clear from the Court's rulings is that it is necessary to
preserve both liberty and security and not compromise one for the other. 97
188. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
189. See id. at 477.
190. See id. at 477-78.
191. Id. at 477 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
192. Id. at 495.
193. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
194. See id. at 501.
195. See supra Parts 11-V.
196. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
197. See id.; see also Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495, 506 (concluding that § 2709 vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment as applied).
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Based on that premise, this article proposes several possible checks which
could be placed on the FBI in fighting the war against terrorism, while at the
same time preventing erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.
A. Prior Judicial Approval
First, Congress could redraft § 2709 to limit the FBI's current un-
checked ability to issue national security letters. One way of accomplishing
this goal would be to include a provision which allows for judicial approval
of national security letters before the FBI issues them. Although doing so
would inhibit the FBI's need for secrecy in terrorism investigations because
of the likelihood that the information will be overheard by the judge's clerks
or staff, 98 it would better protect Fourth Amendment rights. 9 9 Under this
approach, the "coercive searches" 2°° that Judge Marrero mentioned would be
at a complete minimum, since a neutral judge or magistrate could objectively
determine whether or not there was probable cause to demand customer re-
cords from communications firms.20'
B. Post Judicial Oversight
Alternatively, Congress could also draft the provision to mandate judi-
cial oversight after the national security letter is received. Although there is
a heightened possibility of infringing upon Fourth Amendment rights be-
cause of the possibility that the information could be leaked by the judge's
employees, °2 this approach at least ensures that the primary purpose of the
government's investigation is to secure intelligence information relating to
terrorism investigations.0 3 Moreover, such a requirement would make cer-
tain that the government is not using the national security letters as a means
of obtaining information solely to conduct domestic intelligence investiga-
tions.20
198. See, e.g., Keith 407 U.S. at 319; Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. at 476; United States v.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 425 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074,
1077 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
199. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
200. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
201. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603-06 (3d Cir. 1974).
203. Id. at 606.
204. See id. But see United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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C. The Keith Approach
In Keith, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court recognized that the
warrant requirement "may vary according to the governmental interest to be
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. '2°5 In dicta,
the Court suggested that it may be willing to approve a different standard by
which to obtain probable cause in domestic security situations.2 °6 Thus, be-
cause in terrorism investigations it is unclear whether the government's in-
terest is truly "domestic '2 7 or "foreign, '2 °8 lowering the probable cause stan-
dard may meet the reasonable needs of the FBI.209 Like the Prior Judicial
Approval approach, the Keith approach would prevent "coercive
searches, 210 since judicial approval would still be required, just at a lower
standard of reasonableness.2 ' Moreover, like the Post Judicial Oversight
approach, this approach would ensure that the issuance of national security
letters truly pertained to terrorism investigations.2 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to 9/11, "[t]errorism was not the overriding national security con-
cern for the U.S. government. 213 The government never had a need to de-
velop the tools necessary to thwart plots of overthrowing the government and
in turn, the democratic system. 214 As a result, the attacks of 9/11 transformed
the nation and eventually transformed the FBI's communications to counter-
act terrorism operations.2 1 Congress responded by enacting the USA
205. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972).
206. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing
probable cause need not follow the exact requirements .. .but should allege other circum-
stances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authoriza-
tion could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court ... and
that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict ....
Id.
207. See, e.g., Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 430; United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074,
1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
208. See, e.g., Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606; United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th
Cir. 1973); Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1945).
209. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
210. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
211. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
212. See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603-06; Keith, 407 U.S. at 323. But see Smith, 321 F.
Supp. at 424.
213. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 10.
214. See id. at 6-10.
215. See id. at 13.
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PATRIOT Act which provided the FBI with investigative tools to shield the
nation from another 9/11 experience.21 6 However, the government may have
gone too far because it took away certain liberties in order to protect such
freedoms in the name of national security.
When Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2709 through the USA PATRIOT
Act, it gave the FBI unchecked power to infringe on Fourth Amendment
rights.217 Specifically, § 2709 authorized the FBI to issue national security
letters to obtain a person's private information from an internet service pro-
vider or telephone company without satisfying Fourth Amendment require-
ments of probable cause and judicial authorization. 18 At the time, Congress'
reasons for compromising Fourth Amendment protections seemed justified,
considering the state of the nation after 9/11. 2 19
Three years after 9/11 and the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act,
the ACLU and an unknown internet service provider fought to protect the
dissemination of Fourth Amendment rights by challenging the constitutional-
ity of § 2709.220 Standing up for those rights, Judge Victor Marrero ruled
that Fourth Amendment protections cannot be guaranteed solely within the
discretion of the FBI because Supreme Court doctrines demonstrate that the
"state of war is not a blank check 221 to infringe upon the rights of American
222citizens.
In a post-9/11 world, technological innovations will continue to threaten
personal privacy. Therefore, it is clear that Congress needs to set boundaries
concerning law enforcement's ability to secure the nation from future terror-
ist attacks. The suggestions mentioned above will provide an effective way
to conduct terrorism investigations, while at the same time protect against
future attacks on Fourth Amendment rights.
216. Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing, supra note 20.
217. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
218. See id. at 495-97.
219. See id. at 477-78.
220. Challenge to NSL Authority, supra note 180.
221. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507, 536
(2004)).
222. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:279
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss2/5
